I. INTRODUCTION
Open space is widely considered to be a source of external amenities that tend to be underprovided in unregulated land markets. This putative market failure provides a motivation for open-space preservation policies ranging from voluntary purchases of development rights to restrictive zoning regulations (see, e.g., Anas, Arnott, and Small 1998; Brueckner 2000; Bockstael and Irwin 2000) . At the same time, the extent to which the provision of open space is inefficiently low remains unclear: If buyers value open space, they should be willing to pay a premium for it, giving developers an incentive to provide at least some even in the absence of land use regulations (Yang and Fujita 1983; Thorsnes 2000; Henderson and Thisse 2001) .
A number of hedonic property value studies have found a positive marginal price for nearby open space, although buyers' willingness to pay for this amenity appears to be highly localized and dependent on perceived likely future availability. Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) found that housing prices in two English cities were increasing in the amounts of public open space and privately owned open space (e.g., farms) within one kilometer, although the size and statistical significance of the effect depended on the relative scarcity of each type of open space. Geoghegan, Wainger. and Bockstael (1997) found that the selling prices of homes in central Maryland were increasing in the amount of forested open space and farmland within 0.1 km, but decreasing in the amount of forested open space and farmland further away. Tyrvainen and Mettinen (2000) found that a forest view increased selling prices of homes in Finland, but that housing prices decreased with distance from the nearest forest. Thorsnes (2002) found that building lots in Michigan adjacent to a forest preserve commanded large selling premia but that selling prices of lots across the street from the adjoining lots were not significantly different from those of lots farther away. Wu, Adams, and Plantinga (2004) found that housing prices in Portland, Oregon, were increasing in the amount of open space in the immediate vicinity (zip code) and in proximity to parks, lakes, and wetlands. Irwin (2002) and Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz (2003) found that housing prices in the Wash ingtonlBaltimore corridor were increasing in the amount of permanently preserved open space nearby, but decreasing in the amount of privately owned forest and agricultural land, suggesting that home buyers may have expected privately owned forest and farm land to be developed.
Although this evidence of localized property price premia suggests that land developers have an incentive to provide local open space amenities, it is not uncommon for jurisdictions to require the provision of these amenities. The presence of private incentives raises questions about the effect of the public regulations: Do requirements of additional open space improve social welfare (i.e., do private land developers voluntarily provide optimal amounts of this amenity)? Or do the regulations force provision of open space beyond the social optimum? We address this issue in this paper by examining empirically how local regulations that require developers to provide local open space amenities affect the value of developed land. We focus on regulations implementing the Maryland Forest Conservation Act of 1991, which sets standards for retaining and providing forest on land undergoing development. We also investigate the effects of minimum lot size and maximum density zoning, regulations that are often justified at least in part as a means of ensuring adequate provision of open space.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine empirically the effect of a regulation governing the provision of withinsubdivision forest amenities on land value. Subdivisions are arguably the most natural unit of observation for studying amenities of this kind in a suburban context because they are designed as self-contained entities. Related work has shown that homeowner association-imposed restrictive covenants in subdivisions increase housing prices, presumably because they increase levels of neighborhood amenities and/or reduce neighborhood disamenities (Speyrer 1989; Hughes and Turnbull 1996) . Section 2 gives a brief description of the Maryland Forest Conservation Act. Section 3 presents a conceptual model of housing prices, which we use to derive a set of hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 discusses the data and Section 5 discusses the econometric specification and estimation methods. We discuss the estimation results and their implications for policy in Section 6.
II. THE MARYLAND FOREST CONSERVATION ACT
The Maryland Forest Conservation Act (FCA) was enacted in 1991 in order to reduce forest loss from development. It applies to any project involving grading on 40,000 or more square feet and requires developers to identify existing forest cover and key environmental features prior to submitting a permit application. Land developers must also submit a forest conservation plan that conforms to restrictions imposed by the Act, including the total amount and location of retained forested area, protective measures for stand edges and specimen trees, and long term agreements (covenants, easements, etc.) that permanently protect retained forested areas. Forest conservation plans must conform to legally established thresholds for clearing, afforestation, and reforestation set according to the area and land use category of the site, existing forest cover, and proposed cleared area.
Administration of the law is delegated to county governments, so that approval of forest conservation plans is part of the overall developmeht approval process. County agencies are afforded little or no flexibility in establishing levels of reforestation or afforestation required under the Act, which are determined by strict formulas set out in the Act, as is exemption from the Act (Galvin, Wilson, and Honeczy 2000; Maryland Department of Natural Resources 2000) . Implementation often results in developers planting trees on a proportion of the land being developed, which may increase the open space within the subdivision. Increases in open space within the subdivisions imposed by the FCA provide an opportunity for measuring any price premium buyers may be paying to the land developer for this forested open space. During the first five years the Act was in force, 65% of the 35,000 acres of forested land reviewed under the act was retained in forest and about a third of the 35% cleared was subsequently replanted (Maryland Department of Natural Resources 2000).
HI. CONCEPTUAL MODEL
We are interested in the effects of land use regulation, namely the effects of regulations implementing the FCA, on the average peracre value of land undergoing suburban residential subdivision development.' We also investigate the price impacts of minimum lot size and maximum density zoning, and add to the literature on price impacts of other types of open space amenities. Following the standard treatment (e.g., Yang and Fujita 1983; Fujita 1989) , assume that a land developer chooses lot size (s), the number of lots (n), local amenities f (z,z°) provided by the share of land in forest cover within (z) and surrounding (z°) the subdivision, and local amenities h(a,a°) provided by the share of land in other forms of open space within (a) and surrounding (a°) the subdivision in order to maximize rent, that is, the value of developed land in the subdivision net of development costs. For simplicity, consider the case of identical households whose willingness to pay per unit of developed land is given by the bid rent function, R(s,f(z,z"),/i(a,a°),y,T,g,u) = -T -x(s,f(z,z°),h(a,a°),g,u) [1]
where y denotes household income, T commuting cost, x a composite of all other purchased commodities, g other public
We treat the land developer and the homebuilder as separate entities in this analysis. "Developed" land is land dedicated to building lots that are ready to be "improved" by building houses. Home builders' demand for developed land is derived from home buyers' demand for improved lots. good amenities (e.g., school quality), and u the equilibrium level of utility in the metropolitan area. The land developer's decision problem is one of maximizing the rent generated by a subdivided parcel of land of size L:
where c is the unit cost of afforestation, k is the unit cost of developing other open space, and Q(L) is the acquisition cost of the parcel, that is, the price of raw land prior to subdivision. The land developer's choices may be subject to several constraints. First, the sum of land in building lots (us) , forested open space (z), and other open space (a) must equal the total area of the subdivision (L):
[3]
Second, under the FCA, the developer is subject to restrictions on minimum amounts of forested open space, [4] in addition to restrictions on minimum lot size, [5] and maximum density,
The constraint on land In some cases, minimum lot size may be determined by public health regulations rather than by zoning. In particular, public health regulations specify the amount of land needed for septic systems when public sewer systems are not available. In such cases, it is possible that septic system requirements rather than minimum lot size zoning will constitute the effective regulatory constraint faced by developers.
The supply of open space amenities in the vicinity of the subdivision can affect the value of land by changing the demand of home buyers without altering land use within the subdivision. The effect of this change in demand is unambiguous: amenities due to open space in the vicinity of the subdivision that increase the buyer's bid rent increase the average value of developed lots per subdivision acre within the subdivision. Similarly, disamenities that exist due to land use in the vicinity of the subdivision decrease the average value of developed lots per subdivision acre, while land uses in the vicinity that have no spillover effects have no effect on the average value of developed lots per subdivision acre. We thus have
Hypori-w.sis 4. Land uses in the vicinity of the subdivision that provide positive (negative) (no) amenities will increase (decrease) (not affect) the average value of developed lots per subdivision acre.

IV. DATA
The data used to test these hypotheses comes from parcels undergoing suburban residential subdivision in five Maryland counties in the Washington/Baltimore metropolitan area. Two of these counties, Montgomery and Prince Georges, include densely populated urban areas that adjoin Washington, D.C. The average commuting distance to the Washington, D.C., central business district (CBD) from the sample subdivisions in these counties is 16.3 miles. Charles County, located southeast of Washington, D.C., and Carroll County, located west of Baltimore, are less densely populated, with subdivisions either dispersed throughout the countryside or clustered around county town centers. The average commute to the nearest CBD from the subdivisions in Carroll and Charles counties is 45.2 miles. The fifth county, Howard, is located between Baltimore and Washington; residents commute to both cities and businesses located there serve both metropolitan areas. The average commute from the sample subdivisions in Howard County to the center of Baltimore (the nearest CBD) is 15.8 miles.
Subdivisions included in the study consist of all single-family detached dwellings, all townhouses, or mixtures of single family detached and townhouse dwellings. Subdivisions with commercial or industrial sites or with lots developed for apartment buildings were omitted to eliminate cases where price depends on the value of lots sold for purposes other than homeownership. The study also was limited to subdivisions with five or more building lots and to subdivisions receiving approval for development between 1991 and 1997. Small subdivisions of less than five lots were eliminated to remove cases where land is subdivided primarily to provide residences for members of a single family.
Data on each subdivision were collected from county planning agencies and from state-maintained GIS databases. Information from county planning agencies was used to identify the subset of subdivisions that fit the residential use criteria. To keep data collection costs manageable, county planning agency data were collected for a random sample of 50% of these identified subdivisions. These data were then matched to lot and parcel data in the Maryland Property View county databases developed and maintained by the Maryland State Department of Planning (M DP). The Property View databases were used to obtain information on tax assessments, sales, attributes of dwelling units that were constructed (CAMA data), and geographic coordinates. We utilized MDP's GIS data on roads, streams, and land use in areas surrounding each subdivision to calculate various attributes of the subdivisions and their surrounding landscapes.
The data include measures of several attributes of the physical utilization of space within each subdivision, including the area in building lots, existing and retained total forested area, area retained in open space, areas of floodplain and wetlands and linear stream frontage. The planning data also indicate whether a public sewer system is available. The Property View data were used to calculate commuting distance to the nearest central business district (Washington, D.C. or Baltimore) and the area in farming, residential development, parks and recreational facilities, and in forest and brush (combined) within a given distance around each subdivision .2 Scores from stateadministered school achievement tests were added to the data as measures of the quality of the public schools serving the subdivisions. The mean income of households of the census tract in which the subdivision was located was used as an estimate of the income of potential and nearby homeowners.
County planning data were used to identify which subdivisions involved grading less than 40,000 square feet and were thus exempt from FCA requirements. Forest acreage required to be provided by the developer of the non-exempt subdivisions were obtained from the forest conservation plans developed for each subdivision by the counties as part of implementing the FCA.
Zoning codes for each subdivision were obtained from the Property View data base. County zoning documents were then used to convert these codes into quantitative measures of land use regulation, specifically, maximum allowable density and minimum lot size. These two forms of zoning have different effects, that is, they are not merely reciprocals of each other. Published zoning regulations in all five counties in the study explicitly allow different maximum allowable densities and minimum lot sizes for townhouses and detached homes within a single zoning code. Howard County zoning regulations explicitly allow a tradeoff 2 For the purpose of these calculations, the subdivision was assumed to lie within a circle around the subdivision centroid. That circle was constructed to have an area equal to that of the subdivision. The Property View data were used to calculate the area in farmland, undeveloped land/brush, and parks/recreational facilities in a ring of a given radius surrounding the circle representing each subdivision. Radii of one-half, one, and two miles were used. between minimum lot size and open space within a subdivision under a single zoning code according to a pre-established formula. Charles and Prince Georges Counties have special density and lot size requirements that allow tradeoffs between density and open space in planned-use developments. Montgomery County allows extra density in certain areas under its transferable development rights program. We used information about characteristics such as townhouses versus detached homes, the amount of open space, and whether the subdivision was designated as a planned use development or used transferable development rights to assign the appropriate minimum lot size and maximum density to each subdivision.
Relatively few of the transactions included in the data set involved sales that could be classified reliably as subdivided but unimproved lots. 3 We therefore used data on sales of single improved lots for which we have data on attributes of the dwelling units on the lots (CAMA data) that could be used to control for the value of improvements. A total of 4,971 building lots in 202 subdivisions (out of a total of 10,085 building lots in 262 subdivisions in the full data set) fit this criterion. Thirty-six of the 202 subdivisions were exempt from the FCA. An additional 50 had no planting requirement. Subdivisions with and without an FCA requirement were quite similar on average in terms of public sewer availability, minimum lot size and maximum density zoning, location, geographic features, and housing attributes.
V. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
We used these data to investigate the effects of FCA requirements and zoning Most of the arms length transactions involving single lots with no assessed value of improvements had sale prices substantially greater than the assessed value of land, suggesting that buyers had paid for housing that had not yet been built. Reporting of sales prices in transactions involving multiple unimproved lots appears to have been erratic, with the total for the entire transaction arbitrarily attributed to the lots involved.
regulations on the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre in the sample subdivisions.
The dependent variable used in the analysis was calculated by summing the sales prices of all improved lots sold in single-lot, arms-length transactions, dividing by the sum of the areas of those lots, and multiplying the result by the share of land allocated to building lots in the whole subdivision.4 We controlled for the value of improvements by including measures of house size, design, and quality, specifically, the square footage of the foundation, the percentages of lots with one and one-half-, two-, and three-story buildings, the type of building material used, general design, the quality of construction, and the county in which the subdivision is located. We controlled for housing market fluctuations and other time-varying influences on price by including the share of lots sold in each year in the sample (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) .
Measures of regulatory restrictions included in the model were the zoned minimum lot size, zoned maximum allowable density, an indicator of whether the subdivision was exempt from the FCA, and, for non-exempt subdivisions, the percentage of subdivision area required to be planted to forest under the FCA. As discussed above, we expect zoned minimum lot size would have a negative effect on the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre, while zoned maximum allowable density would have a positive effect. A positive effect of the FCA requirement on the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre indicates that the FCA constitutes a binding constraint and that willingness to pay for forested open space exceeds the opportunity cost of providing it;
At least three-quarters of the total number of lots had been sold in almost half the subdivisions in the sample. Between 50% and 75% of the total number of lots had been sold in an additional sixth of the subdivisions in the sample. Between 20% and 50% of the total number of lots had been sold in over a sixth of the subdivisions in the sample. Less than 20% of the total number of lots had been sold in the remaining sixth of the subdivisions in the sample. a negative effect suggests that the FCA forces developers to provide more forested area than is optimal.
The inclusion of zoning raises an important specification issue. It has been argued that zoning is often endogenous in the sense that developers may often persuade local governments to alter zoning to accommodate development to higher value uses. Several empirical studies support the assertion that zoning "follows the market" in this manner (see for example Wallace 1988; McMillan and McDonald 1991a , 1991b and Munneke 2005) . This argument and the empirical studies supporting it typically refer to changes in designated use (commercial versus industrial versus residential classifications). Our situation is different in that the time period involved is short and that we are considering only land zoned for residential use. Moreover, our model includes a large number of locational and geographic attributes, making it unlikely that the zoning variables will serve as proxies for unmeasured features of these kinds. A test for the endogeneity of zoning indicates that the hypothesis of no correlation between the zoning variables and the regression error cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level. Another test rejected the hypothesis that the coefficients of the zoning variables were equal to zero. Finally, we ran the model omitting the density and minimum lot size zoning variables. The estimated signs, magnitudes, and significance of all the remaining coefficients were unchanged.5
We tested for the endogeneity of zoning using the form of the Hausman test introduced for nonlinear estimators by Rivers and Vuong (1988) . We regressed zoned density and minimum lot size separately on subdivision size, county dummies, a dummy indicating whether the subdivision was located in a Census defined place, the share of commercial and industrial land within a mile of the subdivision, and distances to Baltimore, Washington, D.C., the nearest town center, the nearest large shopping mall, the Bay Bridge, the nearest sports facility, the nearest landfill, the nearest jail, and the nearest military installation. The respective t-statistics of the estimated residuals for density and lot size were -1.39 and -1.45, The likelihood ratio test statistic for omitting the zoning variables was 24.4 with 4 degrees of freedom.
A dummy variable indicating whether the subdivision was served by a public sewer system was also included. Public health regulations govern the amount of land needed for septic systems, so this variable can also be considered to be an indicator of regulatory restrictions. Since public sewer service is typically available in areas close to previously developed land and is generally not available in more remote areas, this specification allowed us to test for differences in the effects of regulatory restrictions in closer-in versus more remote subdivisions. We used this dummy variable to estimate separate coefficients of all of the independent variables for subdivisions with and without public sewer access. A likelihood ratio test indicated a significant difference between subdivisions with and without public sewer access (the test statistic was 66.7 with 24 degrees of freedom). However, 18 of these interaction terms were dropped from the model after likelihood ratio tests indicated that they were jointly not significantly different from zero.6
Other amenities provided within the subdivision were grouped into two categories: (1) walking paths, tot lots, and sitting areas; and (2) playing fields, tennis courts, and swimming pools. The data include discrete 0-1 indicators of whether amenities in these categories were present or absent in the subdivision. These amenities should have the same qualitative effects as forest cover: a positive (negative) effect on the per-acre price of land if the value of the increase in local amenities provided is greater (less) than the marginal 6 The coefficients of the interaction terms involving maximum density and minimum lot size were significantly different from zero while those involving the FCA were not. We tested whether the interactions involving the FCA variables were significantly different from zero separately from the remaining control variables. The test statistic for all interaction coefficients except the FCA requirement and whether the subdivision was exempt from the FCA was 13.3 with 16 degrees of freedom, compared to a lO% critical value of 24.77. The test statistic for the two interaction coefficients involving the FCA was 17.28 with 2 degrees of freedom, less than the lO% critical value of 25.99. development cost. 7 If these amenities are perfectly divisible, then in a competitive market, developers should provide them in amounts that equate buyers' marginal willingness to pay for them with the developers' marginal costs of providing them, and the coefficients of these indicators in the hedonic price model would yield an estimate of this equilibrium marginal willingness to pay. These amenities are not perfectly divisible, however; for example, fields and tennis courts need to meet standard size requirements while playground equipment often comes in standard sizes. Thus, interpreting the coefficients of these indicators as estimates of willingness to pay or marginal costs is not necessarily appropriate.
Geographical characteristics of the subdivision included the total area of the subdivision; the distance from the subdivision to the nearest CBD, town center, and large shopping mall; initial forested area; and the area of wetlands and floodplain within the subdivision. The per-acre acquisition cost of land tends to decrease with the amount of land purchased; hence a larger total area should indicate a lower development cost and should thus have a negative effect on the per-acre value of improved lots per subdivision acre. The standard tradeoff between travel cost and land cost similarly suggests that distance from the nearest CBD, town center, or large shopping mall should each have a negative effect on the per-acre value of improved lots per subdivision acre. The area of wetlands and floodplain and initial forested area also could affect the cost of development as well as the cost of providing open space and other amenities.
Land uses in the immediate vicinity of the subdivision included area in farmland, parks and recreation areas, and forest/brush land outside of the subdivision but within a given distance around the subdivision.
Two other classes of amenities-community centers and golf courses--were defined in the data collection process. But only five subdivisions were found to have these amenities in the sample, too few to be included in this type of analysis.
The conceptual model outlined above suggests that the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre should be increasing (decreasing) in the area of any type of open space in the vicinity of the subdivision that provides amenities (disamenities) to potential residents. Factors affecting the willingness to pay of potential residents included income and school quality, both of which should have positive effects on the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre.
Two subdivisions in the sample lacked zoning information, a third lacked income information, and a fourth lacked information on the percentage of wetlands. The sample used in the econometric analysis consequently used data from 4,911 transactions (out of a total of 9,911 building lots) in 198 subdivisions. Descriptive statistics of these data are given in Table 1 .
Proper specification of functional form is an important concern in hedonic models. For that reason, we used a Box-Cox model to test whether a linear, log, or more general transformation was appropriate for both the dependent and continuous independent variables. We estimated hedonic price models with the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre in each subdivision as the dependent variable using Box-Cox transformations of the dependent variable and of the distance and subdivision size variables. The estimated Box-Cox transformation parameter of the dependent variable was significantly different from both zero and one ( Table 2 ), indicating that a more general nonlinear transformation rather than a log transformation or linearity was appropriate. This procedure did, however, indicate the desirability of a log transformation for distance from the CBD, town center, large shopping mall, and total acreage of the subdivision.
Because the value of open-space amenities has been shown to decline sharply with distance, we estimated models including the areas of farmland, forest and brush, and public parks within one-half, one, and two miles of the subdivision. The results of all three models were substantially the same, hence only the estimation results for the model including open space within one mile are reported. All three models were tested for the presence of spatial autocorrelation using Moran and Lagrange multiplier tests and a variety of distance measures. None of the test statistics were larger than the critical values at any of the usual confidence levels and we consequently did not adjust the hedonic model for spatial autocorrelation. Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients of the variables expected to influence the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre; the coefficients of the variables used to control for the value of improvements (housing size and quality and the county in which each subdivision was located) are given in the appendix. We report results for three specifications of the average improved lot value model: Column (1) shows the estimated parameters of a model with a complete set of control variables, column (2) a model with a restricted set of control variables, and column (3) a model with a complete set of control parameters but without the zoning variables. As we discuss below, these three specifications demonstrate the robustness of the parameter estimates. The estimated coefficients indicate that the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre in these subdivisions was influenced by the forms of regulation considered, by open space amenities provided by the developer, by the amount of forest initially present, by subdivision size, by location relative to the closest CBD and large shopping mall, and by income but not by open space amenities in the vicinity of the subdivision.
VI. ESTIMATION RESULTS
Consider first the effects of the FCA. The coefficient of the FCA planting requirement is positive and significantly different from zero at a lO% level or better in all three specifications. Its magnitude changes very little with the inclusion of a larger number of housing attribute controls or with the exclusion of the zoning variables, Its Hardie, Lichtenberg, and Nickerson: Regulation, Open Space, and 
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standard error does change with the inclusion of a larger number of controls, indicating collinearity between the FCA requirement and attributes like building type, construction material, and year of sale. This positive association between FCA requirements and the average value of improved lots within subdivisions is consistent with hypothesis 1, that the FCA causes developers to provide more forested acreage than they would in the absence of regulation, with a consequent increase in the value of amenities provided by forested open space that exceeds the opportunity cost of land adjusted for changes in the cost of developing other forms of open space.
The justification for the FCA is that developers tend to retain or plant less forest than is socially desirable (Richer 1995) .
Government assessments claim that the FCA has been effective in forcing developers to provide more forested area than they would in the absence of regulation (Galvin, Wilson, and Honeczy 2000, Maryland Department of Natural Resources 2000) . The results obtained here support this claim, since the effects of the FCA requirements are quantitatively significant: If there is no bias in the estimated Coefficients due to unobserved subdivision characteristics, an increase in forest planting requirements equal to 1% of the area of the subdivision would result in a 1.2% or $6,671 increase in the average value of I mproved lots per subdivision acre (Table 3)8 Our results do not allow us to evaluate the claim that developers would provide less than the socially optimal amount of open space, however, since we lack information on the costs of developing forested open space (as well as the value of any environmental spillovers such as stream protection outside the subdivision).
As in the case of the FCA requirement, the choice of controls affects the significance levels more than the magnitudes of the coefficients of the zoning variables, an indication of collinearity between the zoning variables and attributes like building type, construction material, and year of sale. The estimated coefficients indicate a significant negative association between minimum lot size zoning and the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre in subdivisions with public sewer access but not in subdivisions without public sewer access (where public health restrictions affect land use). One possible explanation 8 As is generally the case with hedonic housing price models, there remains a possibility that our estimated coefficients are subject to bias due to the influence of unobserved subdivision characteristics. Our models include a large number of geographical characteristics of subdivisions and the area surrounding them in addition to the kinds of housing characteristics, locational attributes, school quality, and other features typically included in hedonic housing price models. Inclusion of such a broad range of control variables should reduce the magnitude of any potential bias.
for the lack of association in the latter case is that lot size requirements for septic systems tend to render zoning regulations superfluous.
As noted above, while one might expect maximum allowable density and minimum lot size zoning to be simple reciprocals, they are not necessarily so in practice because developers may choose to allocate some land that could be in building lots to open space amenities and because topographic and geological considerations may limit how space is configured within the subdivision. The estimated coefficients provide some, albeit equivocal, evidence in support of this notion. The model with a restricted set of controls indicates a significant negative association between maximum allowable density zoning and the average value of improved lots in subdivisions with public sewer access. This result is not robust with respect to specification of the model, however.
All of the zoning variable coefficients have signs that are in accordance with hypotheses 2 and 3, consistent with previous findings of a concave market-clearing price of land. The impacts of zoning are economically as well as statistically significant: If zoning can be treated as exogenous as our endogeneity test indicates, an increase in the minimum lot size requirement of one acre per lot is associated with a decrease in the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre on the order of 56°A), or $318,442, in closer-in subdivisions with public sewer access while an increase in maximum allowable density of one lot per acre in these areas is associated with an increase in the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre of 4%, or $22,057. These results have implications for debates over the role of local land use planning in promoting urban sprawl. The negative coefficient of zoned minimum lot size suggests that county planning agencies in Maryland force developers to subdivide into a smaller number of larger lots than would be privately profitable in the closer-in suburbs. It has been argued that this extends the urban boundary, accelerates rural land conversion, and thus promotes sprawl (Moss 1977; Pasha 1996) . Our results, which suggest that the effects of minimum-lot-size zoning are limited to previously developed portions of the Washington/Baltimore area and are consistent with this proposition. Overall, then, our results provide some empirical support for the contention that zoning restrictions have been contributing to urban sprawl in the Washington/Baltimore area.
The coefficients of the indicator of one kind of open space amenities (walking paths/ tot lots/sitting areas) are positive and significantly different from zero. These amenities increase the average value of improved lots per subdivision acre substantially. Housing in subdivisions with walking paths, tot lots, and/or sitting areas sold for an average of 35V0-46°/ more per acre of developed land than in subdivisions without this amenity.9
As is true for several other studies, our findings indicate that the amenities provided by neighboring open space are highly localized. Furthermore, our results suggest these amenities are primarily localized within subdivisions rather than depending on proximity per se. The coefficient of the nearby farmland variable is negative but not always significantly different from zero, consistent with the notion that potential homebuyers could expect existing farmland to be developed (Irwin 2002; Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz 2003) but also suggesting that the surrounding land use outside of the subdivision is not important to the subdivision buyers. Likewise, the coefficient of nearby park land is positive, as one would expect, but not statistically significantly different from zero, while the coefficient of land in forest and brush is similarly not statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting a lack of The coefficients of subdivision area, the distance from the nearest CBD, and the nearest large shopping mall are all negative and significantly different from zero. As was discussed above, one would expect undeveloped land to be cheaper (and hence the market-clearing price of improved land lower) in larger subdivisions and in subdivisions in more remote locations. One would also expect buyers' willingness to pay for land to be lower in subdivisions farther from the city center and from amenities such as shopping. The coefficient estimates obtained here conform to those expectations. The coefficient of the distance to the nearest town center is not significantly different from zero, contrary to expectation. A possible explanation is that shopping and entertainment are focused on malls rather than town centers.
The coefficients of both demand shifters (school quality and household income) are Positive, although only the coefficient of income is significantly different from zero. As noted above, one would expect a higher willingness to pay in areas with better schools and with households with higher incomes. The signs of the coefficient estimates obtained here conform to those expectations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Open space is widely cited as a source of amenities threatened by expansion of the urban boundary into rural areas. Economic theory suggests that unregulated markets may provide too little of such positive externalities. Open-space preservation policies ranging from purchases of development rights to restrictive zoning have been used to correct this potential externality.
But developers may also have an incentive to incorporate open-space amenities into subdivision plans as a means of capturing buyers' demand for these amenities through higher improved lot prices. If demand for these amenities is highly localized, as many empirical studies suggest, then land price premia arising from these amenities may be sufficient to induce developers to provide socially optimal levels of open space, in which case regulations would be at best unnecessary and at worst counterproductive.
This paper presents a hedonic model of land price response to a particular type of open space regulation, namely tree planting requirements under Maryland's Forest Conservation Act (FCA). The model is used to investigate the extent to which these requirements constrain developers of suburban residential subdivisions. We find that average values of developed lots per subdivision acre are positively associated with the percentage of the subdivision that developers are required to plant in forest under the FCA. This result is consistent with the notion that the regulation does not induce developers to provide more forested area than buyers are willing to pay for. We also find no evidence that average values of improved lots per subdivision acre are increasing in public open space outside of the subdivision, which suggests that benefits from open-space amenities remain largely internal to the subdivision. Thus, land market incentives mitigate but do not eliminate the justification for open-space preservation policies.
We also investigate the effects of zoning. Unlike most previous studies, we study the impacts of zoning on developers, the agents whose decisions are most directly affected. We find a significant negative correlation between minimum lot size zoning and the average per acre price of improved lots in subdivisions where public sewers are available (i.e., close to previously developed areas). These results are consistent with theoretical predictions indicating that zoning promotes sprawl. 
